Book Review: “Full Aid” Insurance for the Traffic Victim by James, Fleming, Jr.
BOOK REVIEWS
and Canada have virtually done away with the jury in personal injury suits, in no
small part because of a lively disapproval of the Hollywood type of trial; and as
the impact of Mr. Belli's book spreads across the country, with its full revelation
of the calculated method by which the thing is done, I would expect to hear a great
deal more of the proposal to abolish it in the United States.
There is much that is excellent in this book, and properly used it can be a thing
of value. But it will not be properly used; and it leaves me very unhappy.
William L. Prosser*
EHRENZWEIG, ALBERT A. "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim. Berkeley,
Calif., University of California Press, 1954. 72 pp. $2.00 (paper bound).
Everyone knows that the automobile accident problem is one of the most im-
portant concerns of modem tort law. And most people see major flaws in the way
tort law is meeting that problem. For thirty years or more, only one type of com-
prehensive solution has been offered-a compulsory compensation scheme roughly
analogous to workmen's compensationi-though there have been some half-way
measures. 2 The comprehensive solution has found no takers in this country, and
the half-way measures have brought less than half-way relief. The accident toll
goes on apace, and the compensation of victims may well be as inadequate as it was
in the early thirties.3
Professor Ehrenzweig offers a solution along a new and different path---one
suggested by a step already taken by automobile liability insurance companies.
He would expand the type of "loss" (or accident) insurance represented by the
medical payments clause often found in existing liability policies, so as to make it
carry the main burden of compensating accident victims. This is a promising
approach and one that deserves earnest and sympathetic study by law makers and
insurers.4
Two competing doctrines have long stood side by side in tort law: liability
based on fault and strict liability. These correspond to "two bases of popular feel-
ing about wrongs, first that the wrongdoer should be made to pay because he has
done wrong and, second, that an innocent person damaged should be made whole
because he has been damaged." 5 Embedded in the former is probably a deep-seated
urge for vengeance, though it is generally clothed in the raiment of healthy deter-
rence of future wrong.6 The two bases of feeling noted may often pull in the same
direction, but also they are often enough in conflict.
From a functional point of view, the motor accident problem calls for two
* Dean, School of Law, University of California.
1 The classic case for such a solution was presented by REPORT BY COMMrEF ro STUDY
COMPENSATION FOR ADTOMfOBILE ACCIDENTS (Columbia University Council for Research in the
Social Sciences, 1932) often referred to as the COLumDIA REPORT.2 Notably compulsory automobile liability insurance in Massachusetts and financial or
safety or security responsibility laws in other states.
3 See James and Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story Too Little and
Too Late, 26 Coux. B. J. 70 (1952) (indicating in the area studied persistence of essentially
the same conditions as disclosed in the COLumBiA REPORT).
4 See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YAu=
L.J. 549, 565-6 (1948).
5 Radin, A Speculative Inquiry into the Nature of Torts, 21 TEx. L. Rxv. 697, 706 (1943).G Cf. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 855, 864-5 (1953).
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things: (1) accident prevention, and (2) the minimization of losses that do occur,
through equitable and efficient administration. These objectives often go hand in
hand, but they may sometimes be in conflict.
As the accident problem has grown in magnitude, there has been increasing
demand upon tort law to serve the objective of loss administration. The emergence
of liability insurance has furnished a method to distribute and minimize losses,
and the liberalization of tort rules has helped plaintiffs get compensation. But the
result is far from ideal; its efficiency in promoting loss administration is constantly
being thwarted by the cross-pursuit of the fault principle because of "the law's
inability to transform a set of quasi-criminal tort rules admonishing a 'wrong-doer'
into a tool for distributing losses inevitably caused by the hazards of our mechan-
ized age." 7 This, Ehrenzweig finds, yields a system marked by "delay, perjury,
and gamble." s He might have added that even the successful litigant finds thrust
upon him a burden of providence and wise investment which he is often ill fitted
to bear.
Ehrenzweig would solve the riddle by divorcing the compensatory from the
admonitory function. Since tort is so much identified with fault and liability in-
surance is so interwoven with tort liability, he would not have the main burden
of compensation carried by either of these, but rather by a form of accident insur-
ance which would provide benefits for victims without regard to fault on anyone's
part. The benefits would be roughly comparable to those found under the more
generous workmen's compensation plans.9 They would generally be made by way
of continuing payments rather than in a lump sum. Experience has shown that
accident victims as a class do not in fact carry accident insurance to any great
extent; and those who need such protection the most are least apt to provide it
for themselves. Ebrenzweig's proposal would not try to make them do so-a futile
task-but would have automobile owners provide it. This is the "full aid" insur-
ance of the title.
Full aid insurance is not to be compulsory. The inducement to buy it would
be furnished by legislation which would relieve those covered by it from liability
for ordinary (in contrast to criminal) negligence. 10 Drivers not covered would
remain subject to existing tort liabilities against which they would be free to take
out liability insurance. Ultimately, it is hoped, full aid insurance would supplant
liability insurance and cover the field.
Pending adoption of the requisite legislation, Ehrezweig invites the insurance
industry to devise and write full aid provisions with benefits available to claimants
who would be willing to waive their tort claims.'
Up to this point, the suggestions have very much indeed to commend them.
To the extent used, full aid insurance would minimize accident losses far more
equitably and efficiently, from a social point of view, than the delay and caprice
of the present system, which affords nearly fabulous recoveries to the fortunate
few12 and to their attorneys, but which spells "too little and too late" for the many.
There are, however, things about the proposal in its present form which trouble
7 EHENzwEiG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR Tim TnRic Vicm! 6 (1954).8 ld. at 5.
9 1d. at 35-8.
'Old. at 1, 30 et seq.
11Id at 39.
12 Much light could be shed on the social value of such recoveries by a study of how they
are spent, or squandered.
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me. In the first place, it seems to furnish too little in the way of sanction against
the irresponsible automobile owner to make him pull his weight in the scheme. The
fear of civil liability does not now induce the judgment-proof to pay premiums for
liability insurance; and there is no reason to expect the same fear to induce them
to pay for full aid coverage. Ehrenzweig would take limited care of the uninsured
driver's victims by payments from an uncompensated-injury fund; 18 but even if
this took complete care of the victims' needs I object to having other elements in
society subsidize judgment-proof car owners for this material part of the cost of
their operation. Aside from my personal feeling that such a subsid3; is not deserved,
I fear it would be planted where it would grow the best crop of irresponsibility that
could be had for the seed. This objection could be largely met by making insurance
in one form or another compulsory-a solution for which I see no satisfactory
substitute.14
There is another aspect of Ehrenzweig's proposal which bothers me. This is his
treatment of "criminal negligence." Here it seems to me he has not put his finger
on the spot which will yield the most in the way of admonition, and perhaps has
not stuck close enough to his admirable objective of divorcing the compensatory
and admonitory functions. "One of the principal features of the proposed scheme
is the denial of relief from liability in cases of criminal negligence." 15 For the"promotion of safety," criminally negligent drivers remain under full civil lia-
bility to their victims and/or to the Fund, which is to be given an action for a
"tort fine" in such cases. Tort fines are also to be levied against criminally negligent
accident victims.16 It is not clear to me that all this will be much of a spur to
safety. There is substantial reason for thinking that liability exerts its most effec-
tive pressure towards accident prevention when it is directed at larger units (indus-
trial, transportation, insurance companies, etc.) rather than at individuals. 17 There
well may be, in other words, very little correlation between the effective pressure
points for accident prevention and the points at which individual fault is greatest,
especially since the group of those originally at fault will probably have more than
its share of the judgment-proof who will scarcely feel this kind of pressure, and
who will, incidentally, furnish little aid to the Fund. If this is true, thought might
profitably be given to recruiting part of the Fund from sources which would be
more efficient in promoting safety.
To the extent that individual penalties are effective deterrents in the present
field, the proposal of tort fines, to be sued for by a Fund which has incentive to
pursue the claims, has some merit. It would probably represent considerable im-
13 This Fund is to be recruited from (1) "tort fines" against the criminally negligent, includ-
ing both the injurer and the injured (to the extent, of course, that such fines prove collectible)
(pp. 30, 33) ; and (2) such contributions from tax sources as might be deemed to correspond to
the taxpayer's saving (e.g. in outlay for the court system) from the new scheme "and to his
fair share in the burden of automobile losses as a nonmotorized user of the road." (p. 30).
Recourse against the Fund would be conditioned on the injuring party's insolvency or
non-liability. (p. 30).14 The insurance companies offer various forms of financial or safety responsibility laws
as the panacea. These have often increased the amount of insurance held, but they still leave
too wide a gap. See JAins AN LAW, note 3 supra; Naw YORK Ixsup~ca DEPARKmxNT, TnE
Paoarxm op ma UxmsuRnu MoTORisT, [Report by Dep. Supt. George H. Kline and Sp. Asst.
Carol 0. Pearson to Supt. Alfred J. Bohlinger, (1951)].1 5 EnRNZWEiG, note 7 supra at 33.16 1d. at 34.
17 See, e.g., James, note 4 supra; James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 769 (1950).
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provement over the practice in our traffic and police courts today. Where tort fines
or common law rights are to be pursued by individual claimants, however, there
is danger of sacrificing the compensation objective. Ehrenzweig sees one difficulty
here, and suggests a remedy which would cut down large common law recoveries
to somewhere within hailing distance of full aid benefits.' 8 I am even more worried
about assuring victims of criminal negligence a speedy and sure access to the mini-
mum benefits of the plan. These are not afforded by full aid insurance even where
the injurer carries it. Presumably they are to come out of the Fund if the injurer
himself is insolvent. But is it contemplated that the victim must first pursue his
common law remedy to judgment and execution unsatisfied before he may have
recourse to the Fund? And where there is a question whether negligence has been
ordinary or criminal, who has the burden of getting that question settled, if a full
aid insurance carrier denies liability? The author's insistence on the importance
of tort fines leaves some doubt on these points. If tort fines are to be retained,
perhaps the victim might be given full aid benefits at once, in all cases, from the
insurance carrier where there is full aid insurance, or from the Fund where there
is not. The Fund could then collect the tort fines, for its own benefit or that of the
insurance carrier as the case may be.
These suggestions and criticisms do not (even if valid) detract from the great
value of Ehrenzweig's proposal. Rather, I hope, they indicate something of the
provocative nature of his proposals. In any event, the present work will take its
place as one of the most serious constructive contributions to the solution of this
critical problem.
Fleming James, Jr.*
3- Emmxzwrn, note 7 supra at 33.
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